mentre WikiLeaks è riuscito ad entrare in possesso di 252 mila telegrammi e memorandum diplomatici, senza nessun apparente allarme.” La Clinton, come gia’ era avvenuto nel dibattito sulle fughe di notizia a Washington ha puntato il dito sul Dipartimento della Difesa, il Pentagono in modo non troppo diplomatico. La fuga di notizie e’ venuta dal Pentagono, ha esclamato con la sua tipica espressione che a Washington chiamano “all’attacco”. Spero che faranno una seria indagine. “Prima cosa, un po’ di contesto: ci fu una decisione da parte dell’amministrazione Bush di rendere disponibili i telegrammi diplomatici [cioè del Dipartimento di Stato] nella rete dei computer del Pentagono, una network speciale fu creato a questo scopo.” Questo avvenne dopo l’11 Settembre con l’idea di facilitare il lavoro dei diversi ministeri e agenzie del governo USA… L’individuo [responsabile per la fuga di notizie] e’ un ufficiale dell’intelligence militare che era stato pienamente autorizzato [ad avere accesso alle carte segrete e confidenziali]” Quindi la graffiata clintoniana: “Io non posso parlare per il dipartimento della Difesa, ma sono sicura che possiamo supporre… che stiano conducendo una indagine vigorosa per capire perche i campanelli d’allarme non hanno funzionato. In più ho dato ordine che si bloccasse l’accesso [del Pentagono] ai nostri telegrammi…”

Come si vede parole fuori dei denti per il capo della diplomazia USA. A Washington, dove la rivalità tra Pentagono e Dipartimento di Stato si perde nella notte de tempi, ci si chiede se questo non equivalga ad accusare il Pentagono di passività se non peggio…

[Umberto Pascali]

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/12/152354.htm

….

QUESTION: Madam Secretary, first of all, as a German, I am thrilled that you’re here with us this evening and want to thank you, as John has and (inaudible) constructive, broad-spectrum speech. My question is about the strategic implications of the so-called WikiLeak affair. When (inaudible) was an individual, I traveled and my credit card figures an irregular-appearing transaction, my bank immediately gets in touch with me. This triggers alarms. This is a basic form of cyber security which applies to hundreds of millions of people.

In the case of WikiLeaks, we have had one individual who engaged in a rather strange transaction, that of downloading 252,000 diplomatic telegrams and memoranda. This apparently triggered no alarms, or if it did, they were not listened to. What are we to make of this very basic, massive breach of cyber security of the United States? What lessons should we as non-Americans draw from what has happened? And what lessons are you going to draw, given the scale of the affair?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, there are lots of lessons to be learned here, and I appreciate the thrust of your question, because obviously, the United States must learn and apply lessons, but the lessons are ones that all of us in the international community will have to apply as well.

First, just a little background: The decision was made in the Bush Administration to add diplomatic cables to the Defense Department’s network, a special network that was created for that purpose.

And the process was undertaken in order to do a better job of what’s called connecting the dots, because after 9/11 one of the principal criticisms of our government was that information was stovepiped, that the Defense Department knew things that the State Department didn’t know that the White House didn’t know and, as a result, there were signals missed and information not processed. So it was understandable for the Bush Administration to say we need to end the stovepiping and figure out how to have greater awareness, situational awareness, and sharing of information.

The individual that you referred to was a fully cleared military intelligence officer. And I cannot speak for the Defense Department, but I’m sure you would assume, which is correct, that they are conducting, and have been, a very vigorous investigation to determine why no alarm bells went off.

In addition, I directed that we would cease sharing, for whatever period of time it may take, our cables. That stopped as soon as this gentleman was apprehended. And he is clearly going to be prosecuted along with anyone who participated or contributed to the crimes that he committed.

But I do think your point is a very important one. We all have now so much information on networks, and no matter how secure you think a network is or how carefully vetted or polygraphed a person might be who has access to that network, it’s probably impossible to have a completely secure network with so many pieces of information that are flowing in and out 24 hours a day.

We are obviously taking steps as I speak to upgrade and make our confidential information more secure, but I think it is incumbent upon everyone else to take a hard look, because as I said shortly after this unfortunate matter came to light, the attack on the United States’s information system was really an attack on the international community. Because for those of us who are in the diplomacy business, we are working to constantly gather information to put things in context so that we better understand what is going on. And there’s no surprise there.

In fact, some of the analysis that has been done of the information that has been made available through these leaks has basically concluded that there’s not much news, there’s not very much to comment on, there’s no big revelation. It’s the day-to-day work of what diplomats all around the world do. And we need to be sure we can continue to have candid and open conversations.

So I hope that we have fixed and will continue to strengthen our own security systems and that all of us do the same, because I believe that this attack, if left unpunished, will be just the first of many against anyone anywhere who can possibly suborn or convince an individual who has access to the systems to provide information for public release.